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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years insurance appraisal has taken a position front and center
in Texas property insurance coverage litigation. Understanding the key
issues in appraisal is essential to properly handling modern property
coverage litigation.
Although appraisal provisions have been a feature of insurance policies
in Texas for well over a century, it has only been in the last fifteen years that
these policy provisions have become a common and hotly contested part of
insurance coverage and bad faith litigation.1 Indeed, in its 2009 opinion in
State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson,2 the Supreme Court of Texas noted that it had
only addressed insurance appraisal provisions a total of five times between
1888 and 2002.3 The old cases were uniform to the effect that appraisal was
a method to establish the value of damaged property—i.e., the “amount” of
the loss—under circumstances where coverage was not in dispute; for
example, when property is damaged or destroyed and the insurance
company and policyholder cannot agree on its value or the amount
necessary to replace it.4
Appraisal-related litigation has grown substantially since, due in large part
to an unfortunate holding from the 2004 Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
opinion in Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds,5 and opinions from other
intermediate appellate courts and federal courts that have followed and
expanded upon the “Breshears rule.”6 This recent line of cases has
incorrectly construed insurance appraisal in a way that may allow for it to
serve as a complete defense to most first-party insurance coverage and bad
faith litigation as a matter of law.

1. See State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. 2009) (stating the court has
attended to the matter of appraisal clauses only a few times prior to 2010s).
2. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009).
3. See id. at 889 (highlighting the regular absence of appraisal-related litigation for over a
century).
4. See Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 38 S.W. 1119, 1119 (Tex. 1897) (“A policy of insurance may
provide that an appraisement shall be made, and that it shall only be conclusive in the event the liability
of the insurer is not disputed . . . .”); Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 18 S.W. 439, 440 (Tex.
1892) (per curiam) (stating an “agreement to ascertain the amount of the loss . . . has been repeatedly
held to be valid as a condition precedent to the right of the plaintiff to sue and recover”).
5. Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
6. See, e.g., Blum’s Furniture Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, 459 F. App’x 366,
368–69 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing the Breshears rule).
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Mistaken reliance by courts on the Breshears rule and the “independent
injury” rule has allowed insurers to escape liability for breach of contract,
attorneys’ fees, statutory and common law “bad faith,” and even liability
under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (PPCA), often irrespective
of whether the evidence shows an insurer knowingly undervalued or
underpaid the claim by a substantial amount when it originally investigated
and adjusted the loss, or even if it could be shown that it did so in bad faith.7
Not surprisingly, given the scope of the defense now provided by appraisal,
issues arising around appraisal have become a large point of focus in firstparty coverage litigation in recent years, yielding a number of developing
issues that have important effects on the parties’ rights.
II. WHAT IS APPRAISAL?
The short answer: appraisal is a contractually agreed process for resolving
a disagreement between the insurance carrier and the policyholder about the
amount of a loss under an insurance policy.8 A typical appraisal clause is found
in the “conditions” portion of a property insurance policy among the other
conditions imposed upon the insured, and it will often read something like
the following from the homeowners’ property insurance policy in Johnson:
Appraisal. If you [the policyholder] and we [insurer] fail to agree on the
amount of loss, either one can demand that the amount of the loss be set by
appraisal. If either makes a written demand for appraisal, each shall select a
competent, disinterested appraiser. Each shall notify the other of the
appraiser’s identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand. The two
appraisers shall then select a competent, impartial umpire. . . . The appraisers
shall then set the amount of the loss. If the appraisers submit a written report
of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon shall be the amount of the
loss. If the appraisers fail to agree within a reasonable time, they shall submit
their differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by any two of these
three shall set the amount of the loss.9

The exact terms can vary from this basic appraisal clause. As discussed
further in this paper, some of those variations can be quite substantial and
give rise to whole new issues. Conceptually, as a condition of the policy, the
7. See, e.g., Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 276–79 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2016, pet. denied) (precluding bad faith claims).
8. See Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 887–88 (defining appraisal).
9. Id. (alteration in original).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss1/5

4

McBride et al.: Insurance Appraisal in Texas and Its Place in Coverage Litigation

2019]

INSURANCE APPRAISAL IN TEXAS AND COVERAGE LITIGATION

105

provision relates to prerequisites to payment of a covered claim, not to
whether the loss or claim is covered or excluded in whole or in part as
defined in the “coverage” and “exclusions” portions of the policy.10
Thus, appraisal is an “extra-judicial” contractual device for resolving a
specific type of disagreement—the amount of a covered loss.11 However,
appraisal is not a form of “arbitration,” even though it has some
similarities.12 The key difference, which has several important implications
for some of the issues addressed elsewhere in this paper, is that appraisal
does not “divest” a Texas court of jurisdiction to decide the legal case, “but
only binds the parties to have the extent or amount of the loss determined
in a particular way, leaving the question of liability for such loss to be determined, if
necessary, by the courts.”13
Some of the basic requirements for an appraisal issue to arise are selfevident from this stated purpose. The insurer and its policyholder must
have (1) a disagreement (2) about the amount of a loss that is (3) apart from
disagreement about the question of coverage or liability for such a loss—
whatever its amount is ultimately determined to be.14
Although this seems simple enough, a number of complicated questions
and issues have sprung up with the rapid proliferation of appraisal as a major
part of insurance litigation since Breshears. These include the following issues
to be addressed in this paper:
•

When must a party invoke appraisal and how can the right to use
the appraisal process be waived?15

10. See Amine v. Liberty Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., No. 01-06-00396-CV, 2007 WL 2264477, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Appraisal does not resolve
coverage issues.” (citing Wells v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1996, writ denied))).
11. See id. at *3 (“The purpose of an appraisal clause is to provide a binding, extra-judicial
‘remedy for any disagreement regarding the amount of the loss.’” (quoting Breshears v. State Farm
Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.))).
12. See Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 889 (“In Scottish Union, we referred to the scope of appraisal in the
course of distinguishing it from arbitration[.]” (citing Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 8 S.W.
630, 631 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1888))).
13. Scottish Union, 8 S.W. at 631 (emphasis added).
14. Cf. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 890 (“The policy directs the appraisers to decide the ‘amount of
loss,’ not to construe the policy or decide whether the insurer should pay.” (citing 15 COUCH ON INS.,
pt. IX, ch. 210, § 210:42, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2018))).
15. See discussion infra Part III.
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•

May an insurer include a unilateral appraisal clause under which
only the insurer may choose to invoke the appraisal process? May
an insurer who includes such a unilateral appraisal clause refuse
to participate in an appraisal requested by the policyholder prior
to a lawsuit, but still compel the policyholder to appraise the loss
after the policyholder has had to hire an attorney and incurred
the expense and delay to file a lawsuit?16

•

What is the scope of the appraisal? What distinguishes
disagreements about the “amount of the loss” to be determined
through the appraisal process from disagreements about the
liability for that loss that is supposed to be determined by the
courts?17

•

On what basis may a party challenge the amount of the loss that
was determined through the appraisal process or the procedures
followed in the appraisal process? And what is the effect of such
a challenge, if successful?18

•

What effect does the determination of the amount of the loss
through appraisal have on other policy issues, such as coverage
denials based on exclusions, application of deductibles and
coverage limits, or other policy conditions about which the
parties might disagree?19

•

Where does the appraisal award fit with the other legal rights and
obligations imposed by the terms of the insurance policy, Texas
common law rights such as common law bad faith, and
provisions of the Texas Insurance Code in Chapters 541
(statutory bad faith) and 542 (PPCA)?20

•

Is appraisal a part of the claims investigation and adjusting
process, or is it a part of the dispute resolution tied into the role
of the courts to ultimately determine the parties’ rights and

See discussion infra Section III.A.4.
See discussion infra Section III.D.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
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liabilities that arise only after the claim has already been
investigated and adjusted by the insurer?21
•

What procedural effect does an agreement or order to appraise
the amount of a loss have on a pending lawsuit for breach of
contract or bad faith? Must or may the lawsuit be abated in whole
or in part pending the outcome of the appraisal process?22

•

What remedies are available in the courts of appeals from orders
compelling or refusing to compel the parties to participate in
appraisal?23

III. INVOKING AND AVOIDING APPRAISAL AND WAIVER OF APPRAISAL
Invoking the appraisal clause will generally depend on the language of the
clause, which may have certain procedural requirements to invoke the
process. For instance, in the above quoted clause from Johnson, once the
policyholder and insurer “fail to agree on the amount of loss” either may
make a “written demand for appraisal.”24 Each side must then select a
“competent, disinterested appraiser” and notify the other side of the
appraiser’s identity within twenty days of the written demand.25 Other
appraisal clauses may contain differences in this particular procedure,
different notice requirements, timelines or deadlines, etc., while some
appraisal clauses, as discussed below, purport to be unilateral—allowing
only the insurer to decide whether the amount of the loss will be determined
through appraisal.26
A. Waiver
As noted above, the determination of the amount of the loss through
appraisal is generally considered binding on the parties as to that specific
issue, subject to a court then determining the effect of that determination

21. See discussion infra Part V.
22. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
23. See discussion infra Section VI.B.
24. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 887 (Tex. 2009).
25. Id. at 887–888.
26. See, e.g., In re GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 10-16-00404-CV, 2017 WL 1749793, at *2
(Tex. App.—Waco May 3, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (discussing a policy containing a
unilateral appraisal clause).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 1, Art. 5

108

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:101

on the parties’ respective rights and liabilities.27 However, after Breshears,
insurers increasingly began to rely on appraisal to avoid—as a matter of
law—any claim for breach of contract, breach of the statutory and common
law duties of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the PPCA, claiming
the Breshears rule excuses any late payment or underpayment of the claim
during the claims adjusting process so long as the insurer pays the appraised
amount of the loss within a reasonable time following the appraisal.28
Consequently, one of the biggest issues that emerged with the sudden
explosion of appraisal following Breshears was the question of when and how
the parties to the insurance policy can waive the right to use the appraisal
process in lieu of submitting their disagreement about the amount of the
loss to the court or ultimately a jury.29 Given the expansive scope of the
defense provided to insurers after Breshears, it became important for
policyholders to attempt to avoid the appraisal process entirely so as to not
lose all of their common law and statutory remedies as a matter of law.30
To waive rights under an appraisal clause, a party “must intend to relinquish
a known right or engage in intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming
that right,” and waiver can be either express or implied by conduct. 31
Express waiver is rarely the question when it comes to appraisal.32
However, there has been considerable case law addressing various situations
under which an insurer might waive its right to appraisal by its conduct.
27. See Johnson, 290 S.W.3d at 889 (“[The appraisal clause] only binds the parties to have the
extent or amount of the loss determined in a particular way, leaving the question of liability for such
loss to be determined, if necessary, by the courts.” (quoting Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy,
8 S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1888))).
28. See, e.g., Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 275 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016,
pet. denied) (“[A] long line of cases has held that full and timely payment of an appraisal award under
the policy precludes an insured from recovering penalties under the [Prompt Payment of Claims] Act
as a matter of law.” (citing In re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d 556, 563–64 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding))).
29. See In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 412 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (explaining that to establish waiver a party must show an impasse was reached and any
failure to demand appraisal within a reasonable time prejudiced the opposing party).
30. See, e.g., id. at 406 (showing a policyholder attempting to avoid appraisal by arguing that the
insurance company waived its rights to appraisal).
31. In re State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig.
proceeding) (citing In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 407).
32. See id. at 794 (“Instead, in deciding whether an insurer waived its right to invoke an appraisal
clause, we also must consider the policy’s language and the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether the insurer intentionally relinquished its appraisal rights or engaged in intentional conduct
inconsistent with claiming these rights.” (citing In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 407; In re
Liberty Ins. Corp., 496 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding))).
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Implied Waiver by Delay

Most of these arguments turn on whether the insurer had waived its right
to rely on the appraisal process by delaying invoking the clause until long
after the insurer had been sued by the policyholder, or otherwise acting in
such a way as to waive appraisal. This sort of waiver has been addressed in
two opinions from the Supreme Court of Texas: the 2002 case In re Allstate
County Mutual Insurance Co.33 and the 2011 case In re Universal Underwriters of
Texas Insurance Co.34 In In re Universal Underwriters, an auto dealership,
Grubbs Infiniti, sustained covered hail damage to the buildings on its
After Universal’s initial inspection and payment of
property.35
approximately $4,000, Grubbs notified Universal that it believed the
inspection and payment was not sufficient and requested a reinspection.36
Universal sent out an engineer who produced an inspection report
identifying an additional amount of covered loss for which Universal paid
an additional $3,000.37 Four months later, Grubbs filed suit for breach of
contract, bad faith, and PPCA.38 After filing suit, Universal moved to
compel Grubbs to participate in appraisal, which the trial court denied based
on Grubbs’s argument that Universal had waived appraisal as a matter of
law by an unexplained delay in requesting it.39 Rejecting Grubbs’s
argument, the court set out two rules governing waiver of appraisal by delay:
•

Any delay is measured from the point at which the parties have
an “impasse.”40 However, an impasse required more than just a
disagreement.41 “An impasse is not the same as a disagreement
about the amount of loss. Ongoing negotiations, even when the
parties disagree, do not trigger a party’s obligation to demand
appraisal. Nor does an insurer’s offer of money to cover damages
necessarily indicate a refusal to negotiate further, or to recognize

33. In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding).
34. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).
35. Id. at 405.
36. Id. at 406.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 408.
41. See id. (clarifying neither disagreements between parties during ongoing negotiations nor
offers to cover damages “indicate a refusal to negotiate further”).
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additional damages upon reinspection.”42 Rather, an “impasse”
was characterized as an “apparent breakdown of good-faith
negotiations.”43
•

2.

Delay alone is not enough—the party avoiding appraisal must
also show substantial prejudice.44 Even if a party unreasonably
delays invoking appraisal after there is an “impasse,” waiver will
still not occur unless the party seeking to avoid the appraisal
process demonstrates that the delay caused some sort of
substantial prejudice.45 Drawing on its legal authorities regarding
waiver in other contexts—including waiver of arbitration
clauses—the court concluded that implied waiver by delay
required both an unexcused delay from the point of impasse and
proof that the delay itself resulted in some harm to the
policyholder, concluding: “[I]t is difficult to see how prejudice
could ever be shown when the policy, like the one here, gives
both sides the same opportunity to demand appraisal. If a party
senses that impasse has been reached, it can avoid prejudice by
demanding an appraisal itself. This could short-circuit potential
litigation and should be pursued before resorting to the
courts.”46

Implied Waiver by Conduct

Aside from delay, waiver could be found from a party’s extensive use of
the courts.47 Generally, to amount to implied waiver of alternative dispute
resolution through participation in the ongoing litigation, the party must
have taken such acts as to have “substantially invoked the litigation
process.”48 In the specific context of appraisal, acts constituting implied
waiver by this sort of conduct are:
42. Id. (citing Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 8 S.W. 630, 632 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.]
1888)).
43. Id. at 409.
44. See id. at 411 (holding a party must show both delay and prejudice to establish waiver).
45. See id. at 412 (“In order to establish waiver, therefore, a party must show that an impasse
was reached, and that any failure to demand appraisal within a reasonable time prejudiced the opposing
party.”).
46. Id.
47. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589–90 (Tex. 2008) (recalling occasions where
parties waive “an arbitration clause by substantially invoking the judicial process”).
48. Id. at 593 (applying to arbitration).
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[Acts] reasonably calculated to induce the [insured] to believe that a
compliance by him with the terms and requirements of the policy is not
desired[] or would be of no effect if performed. . . . [and] relied on must
amount to a denial of liability[] or a refusal to pay the loss.49

In a recent opinion from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, the court
agreed there was implied waiver by conduct where the insurer, Allstate,
made six inspections of the home after being sued, unsuccessfully attempted
to remove the case to federal court (it was remanded), agreed to a trial
setting, moved for and obtained an order for a seventh inspection of the
home, moved for and received extensions of time to designate its experts,
and was allowed to designate a new expert.50 After all of this, Allstate made
an offer to settle the lawsuit, which the homeowner rejected.51 Reviewing
all of Allstate’s conduct in the case, the court concluded: “Based on the facts
and circumstances outlined above, we hold that it was within the trial court’s
discretion to determine that Allstate’s conduct clearly constituted intentional
conduct inconsistent with its right to invoke the contractual right of an
appraisal to determine the amount of loss . . . .”52 The court emphasized
that in obtaining some of the extensions, new inspections, and additional
experts, “Allstate directly verbally expressed to the trial court Allstate’s
intent to go to trial despite lack of satisfaction of the appraisal clause
condition precedent.”53
The court characterized Allstate’s settlement offer as a mere masquerade
attempting to establish a new “point of impasse concerning the amount of
loss” and emphasized that:
[The offer] was not made until after discovery was closed, after the expert
designation deadline had passed, after Jackson had been deposed, after
Allstate had agreed to a trial setting, after Allstate had requested and had
obtained an extension of the expert designation deadline, and after Allstate

49. In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 407 (quoting Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
Clancy, 8 S.W. 630, 632 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1888)).
50. In re Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., 549 S.W.3d 881, 883–84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2018, orig. proceeding).
51. Id. at 885.
52. Id. at 890.
53. Id. (citing In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 407).
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had compelled an opposed seventh inspection of the insured’s home for the
express purpose of trial preparation.54

On the question of prejudice, the court initially noted that it is difficult to
show prejudice “simply by a delay in requesting an appraisal after the point
of impasse . . . .”55 The court looked to the whole record and found more
than mere delay, concluding, “Prejudice to a party may arise in any number
of ways that demonstrate harm to a party’s legal rights or financial
position[,]” and that in addition to proving prejudice in the form of incurring
expense, “prejudice may arise not only from the delay but also from the
requesting party’s intentional conduct in the meantime—like conduct
triggering additional expenses, conduct constituting inherent unfairness,
conduct constituting purposeful manipulation of the appraisal process, and
conduct giving the party requesting appraisal an unfair tactical advantage.”56
The court detailed some of the facts constituting prejudice, including:
•

the insured “could not use her only expert . . . as an appraiser
because she had selected him to replace her roof;”57

•

“the roof damage to her home was over two and a half years old
when Allstate demanded an appraisal, and storms during those
two and a half years had added to her roof damage, making it
impossible for an appraiser to now determine what damage was
caused by which storm;”58

•

“Allstate had compelled a seventh inspection of [the] roof just a
few weeks earlier,” obtaining it by “repeatedly representing to the
trial court that a seventh inspection was necessary [specifically]
for Allstate to use in the upcoming jury trial;”59

•

“an appraisal [would] take weeks or months to accomplish,
further delaying resolution of this matter, which Jackson’s
counsel represented could be tried in one or two days;”60 and

54. Id. at 891 (citing Jai Bhole, Inc. v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., No. G-10-522, 2014 WL 50165,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2014)).
55. Id. at 892.
56. Id. (quoting In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 411).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 893.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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with the proximity of the trial, her counsel had already expended
substantial time and expense preparing for the trial Allstate had
told the court it intended to go forward with when it obtained an
order allowing the seventh inspection and the chance to designate
a new expert.61

Implied Waiver by Failure or Refusal to Participate

Cases where a waiver of appraisal by an insurer has been found often
involve situations where the policyholder has expressly invoked the
appraisal process, but the insurer has refused or failed to participate.62
For instance, in the 1895 case Northern Assurance Co. v. Samuels,63 the
insurer invoked the appraisal clause, but then refused to appoint its own
appraiser and failed to show up for the appraisal.64 The court held that the
insurer had abandoned the demand and could not rely on a subsequent
demand for appraisal in which it did finally appoint an appraiser, having
already shown that it was not interested in following the policy’s appraisal
process.65
A year later, in Manchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Simmons,66 the court rejected
an insurer’s argument claiming a district court judgment in favor of the
insured should have been overturned because the insured refused to submit
the claim to appraisal under the policy.67 The insurer ignored letters from
the insured trying to resolve the dispute about the amount of the loss
without suit.68 The court concluded:
The company, through its agents, met the approaches of the [insured] for
settlement with indifference, and exhibited a disinclination to go into any kind
61. Id.
62. There is one notable exception to this regarding unilateral appraisal clauses discussed in the
next section. See discussion infra Section III.A.4.
63. Northern Assur. Co. v. Samuels, 33 S.W. 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1895, no writ).
64. See id. at 240–41 (detailing how insurer invoked the appraisal clause and subsequently failed
to both appoint an appraiser and attend the appraisal).
65. See id. at 242 (“Having made a demand which was abandoned by it, and such abandonment
not being caused by [the policyholders], they had a right to consider the appraisement waived. . . . The
appraisement being waived, [the insurer] had no right to make the subsequent demand.” (citing
Chapman v. Rockford Ins. Co., 62 N.W. 422 (Wis. 1895))).
66. Manchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 35 S.W. 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1896, writ ref’d).
67. See id. at 724 (holding the insurer’s position is not sound because the insurer did not submit
the claim pursuant to the appraisal policy).
68. Id. at 723.
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of investigation and determination of the amount of the loss. . . . [The
company] has refrained from such investigation as might have led to an
agreement, and by this course has also prevented the occurrence of the
contingency in which appraisers are provided for by the contract. It certainly
should not be permitted to sit back and take no action until suit is brought to
enforce its liability, and then successfully urge as a defense that the amount of
the loss has not been agreed upon or fixed by appraisers.69

Similarly, in the recent case of Southland Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Cantu,70 the
court found waiver by the insurer.71 The insurer received a letter from the
insured expressly invoking the appraisal process, but never responded to
this letter.72 The insured filed suit and the insurer waited another sixteen
months to file its motion to compel appraisal, which was almost two and a
half years after the insured’s letter invoking the appraisal process.73
4.

Unilateral Appraisal Clauses—Split of Authority

Even if the insurer expressly refuses to participate in appraisal when it is
requested by the insured, some courts have refused to find this waived
appraisal if the policy contains a unilateral appraisal clause that may only be
invoked by the insurance carrier.74 Thus, an insurer who has such a
provision can ignore or refuse any requests by its policyholder to appraise
the loss and wait to invoke the appraisal clause only after the insured files a
lawsuit.75 Such an approach was upheld by two courts, who principally
relied on “anti-waiver” provisions of the policy to essentially conclude that
implied waiver was a near legal impossibility regardless of the insurer’s
conduct.76 However, the Dallas Court of Appeals—reviewing the same
69. Id.
70. Southland Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Cantu, 399 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet.
denied).
71. See id. at 577–78 (finding the trial court did not err when it denied Southland’s motion for
an appraisal).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 578.
74. See In re GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 07-15-00281-CV, 2015 WL 5766496, at *3
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding unilateral appraisal clauses
are generally enforceable).
75. See, e.g., Biasatti v. GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 07-17-00044-CV, 2018 WL 3946352,
at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16, 2018, pet. filed) (noting insurer’s discretion to refuse requests
to appraise prior to insured’s filing of suit due to the presence of a unilateral appraisal clause within the
policy).
76. See In re GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 10-16-00404-CV, 2017 WL 1749793, at *3
(Tex. App.—Waco May 3, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding a non-waiver clause valid such
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unilateral clause used by the same insurance company—held otherwise,
finding the insurer’s pre-suit refusal to participate in appraisal after it was
requested by the insured was an express election that it was not going to rely
on appraisal.77 In In re GuideOne National Insurance Co.,78 the court held this
did not implicate the “anti-waiver” provision because it did not alter the
conditions or terms of the policy:
[T]he language of the policy makes appraisal an option available to the insurer
and not a condition precedent to suit. Thus, concluding the insurer has
evidenced an intention not to exercise its option does not in any way alter the
terms of the policy.79

Such clauses may implicate public policy concerns as well, as a unilateral
appraisal clause can effectively be used to force a policyholder to file a
lawsuit in order to get an insurance claim resolved. “‘[C]ontracts against
public policy are void and will not be carried into effect by courts of justice.’
A contract is against public policy if it is illegal or injurious to the public
good.”80 Courts look to state statutes and judicial decisions to determine
public policy.81 Thus, in determining public policy, courts must give special
deference to the public policy determinations of the legislature.82
Unilateral appraisal clauses that are interpreted to allow the insurer to
invoke appraisal after making the policyholder file a lawsuit would seem to
contravene the clear public policy stated in the Insurance Code prohibition
against “compelling a policyholder to institute a suit to recover an amount
due under a policy” by substantially underpaying a covered loss.83 If the
policyholder disagrees that it has been paid what is owed under the policy
that any issue about a waiver of appraisal clause was immaterial); In re GuideOne, 2015 WL 5766496,
at *3 (refusing to address a non-waiver argument after finding the unilateral appraisal clause valid).
77. See In re GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 05-15-00981-CV, 2015 WL 5050233, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 27, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s determination
that insurer waived its right to seek appraisal in refusing to participate in appraisal prior to the insured’s
filing of suit).
78. In re GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 05-15-00981-CV, 2015 WL 5050233 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Aug. 27, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
79. Id. at *1 n.2.
80. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 152 S.W.3d 172, 182 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied) (en banc) (first quoting James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512, 520 (1851); then citing 14 TEX.
JUR. 3D Contracts § 143 (1997)).
81. Stubbs v. Ortega, 977 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
82. Westchester Fire, 152 S.W.3d at 182.
83. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.003(b)(5).
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and its attempts to invoke appraisal are refused by the insurer because the
clause is unilateral, the policyholder has no means other than a lawsuit to
obtain the underpaid or unpaid coverage benefits. This issue was raised by
the Amarillo Court of Appeals in one of the three GuideOne cases discussed
above.84 However, it was rejected solely on the basis that the court refused
to be the first court to invalidate a unilateral appraisal clause on public policy
grounds.85
B. Coverage Denials and Disagreement About the Amount of Loss
Another common issue that arises in the context of initiating appraisal is
whether the parties have a “disagreement” about the amount of the loss.86
This often comes up in the context of outright coverage denials by an
insurer. For instance, an insurer might take the position that, regardless of
the amount of the loss, no coverage is owed because the loss would fall
under an exclusion in the policy or it was caused by an occurrence that predates the coverage period provided by the policy.87
It has long been the law in Texas that denying a claim accomplishes a
waiver of conditions of the policy that then become superfluous to perform,
since the claim has been denied.88 For instance, this has been held to
prevent attempts to avoid payment of denied claims by later claiming a proof
of loss has not yet been given.89 There is no reason to insist on performance
of conditions like this after the insurer has already refused to pay the claim
on some other basis.90
84. See In re GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 07-15-00281-CV, 2015 WL 5766496, at *3
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (implying an insured’s sole means
of challenging allegedly underpaid benefits is to file suit when the relevant policy contains a unilateral
appraisal clause).
85. See id. (“Exactly how we should deal with the nonwaiver argument is left unsaid.”).
86. See, e.g., In re Liberty Ins. Corp., 496 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
orig. proceeding) (“[The policyholder] argued that the parties did not disagree over the ‘amount of loss’
because Liberty denied that a ‘loss’ under the Policy occurred at all.”).
87. See, e.g., Viles v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990) (discussing insurer’s
decision to deny coverage after asserting the damage pre-dated the coverage period).
88. See Ford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1977) (finding
insurer’s unconditional claim denial waived policy conditions).
89. See Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567–68 (finding insurer’s denial of insured’s claim before proof of
loss was due waived the policy’s proof of loss provision).
90. See id. at 568 (Hetch, J., concurring) (“[A]n insurer’s denial of a claim before the deadline
for presenting the required proof of loss waives that requirement as a matter of law.” (citing Sanders
v. Aetna Life Ins., 205 S.W.2d 43, 44–5 (Tex. 1947); Hazlitt v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
212 S.W.2d 1012, 1013 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 1948), aff’d, 216 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1949); Angelo
State Univ. v. Int’l Ins. Co. of N.Y., 491 S.W.2d 700, 701–02 (Tex. App.—Austin 1973, no writ)));
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When the insured files suit after the insurer denies coverage, may the
insurer still invoke the appraisal clause to determine the amount of the loss
if it were covered? Texas courts have generally concluded that the mere
denial of a claim does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right to refer
the disagreement to appraisal, but the circumstances of the claim and the
nature of the denial must be considered to determine whether the insurer
has waived the right to appraisal.91 “Whether an insurer denied a
homeowner’s claim for damages under the governing policy is relevant to
the question of waiver of the appraisal clause, but it is not determinative of
that question.”92
In In re Liberty Insurance Corp.,93 for instance, the insurer denied that any
loss had occurred at all, and on that basis denied the claim.94 The insured
argued the parties did not have a disagreement about the “amount of the
loss” and that there was thus nothing to determine in appraisal.95
Discussing Justice Brister’s opinion in Johnson, the court noted that a

Angelo State Univ., 491 S.W.2d at 701 (stating that the policyholder has a “contractual obligation to
furnish [the insurer] with a sworn statement of loss[,]” but also acknowledging “the well-established
rule of law that insurer will be deemed to have waived this requirement where insurer denies liability
within the time allotted by the terms of the policy for proof of loss to be furnished” (citing Fed. Sur.
Co. v. Smith, 41 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1931, holding approved); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Bimco Iron & Metal Corp., 464 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1971))); see also Hazlitt, 212 S.W.2d at 1013 (detailing
an insurer’s refusal to permit a policyholder from submitting proof of loss); Am. Cas. & Life Ins. Co.
v. McCuistion, 202 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The rule is
unquestioned in this state that where the insurance company denies liability under the terms of the
policy, that a compliance with the policy to furnish proofs of loss is waived and a recovery may be had
thereon without furnishing such proofs.” (quoting Smith, 41 S.W.2d at 213)).
91. See In re Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., 542 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2018, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (explaining the need to examine the circumstances of a claim and
the nature of a denial of benefits when determining whether an insurer has waived appraisal); see also
Pounds v. Liberty Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 528 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, no pet.) (“Waiver of a contractual right may be express or implied from conduct.” (citing G.T.
Leach Builders., LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 511 (Tex. 2015))).
92. In re Liberty Ins. Corp., 496 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding) (citing State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tex. 2009)); see also Johnson,
290 S.W.3d at 894 (“When an insurer denies coverage, appraisers can still set the amount of loss in
case the insurer turns out to be wrong.” (citing Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 38 S.W. 1119, 1119–20
(Tex. 1897))).
93. In re Liberty Ins. Corp., 496 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding).
94. See id. at 231 (discussing insurer’s denial that a loss under the policy occurred at all).
95. Id.
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determination that there is no damage is still a determination of the amount
of the loss—$0 would be the value set for that loss by the insurer.96
It is a different result if an insurer were to deny a claim based solely on
an exclusion without valuing the loss. In an opinion released before the
Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson, the Amarillo court in In re Acadia
Insurance Co.97 concluded there was no abuse of discretion in denying a
motion to compel appraisal where the insurer agreed there was tangible
damage to the property, but based its denial entirely on the assertion that
the damage was completely caused prior to the policy period by noncovered events.98 Unlike In re Liberty, the insurer had not assigned a value
to the loss (whether $0 or otherwise).99
This is still a potentially confusing distinction. If an insurer admits there
is tangible damage, but claims it was not caused by a peril covered during
the relevant policy term—as in In re Acadia—and on that basis offers no
position as to the amount of the loss, how can there be a “disagreement”
between the insured and the insurer about the “amount of loss”? The
condition necessary to trigger appraisal arguably does not exist in that
scenario, or where the insurer’s denial of the claim is based solely on an
exclusion and expresses no position on the existence of, or value of, the
property damage.100 Where there is no disagreement, there can be no
“impasse,” and the only recourse available to the insured would be to file
suit.101 Moreover, couching the rule about appraisals going forward
“without preemptive intervention by the courts” limits its application, since
the author of Johnson clearly intended it to be more difficult to preempt
appraisals than to avoid them once completed. 102
96. Id. at 234; see also Pounds, 528 S.W.3d at 225 (asserting insurer’s determination that there was
“no storm related damage” was a disagreement about the amount of loss and therefore subject to
appraisal).
97. In re Acadia Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, orig. proceeding).
98. Id. at 780.
99. Compare id. (noting insurer had not assigned a value to the loss due to its belief that the
damage was caused by non-covered events), with In re Liberty, 496 S.W.3d at 234 (explaining a finding
of $0 by an insurer is still an assignment of value to the loss).
100. See In re Acadia, 279 S.W.3d at 780 (noting conditions for appraisal are not present when
the insurer does not take a stance as to the loss in question).
101. See id. (refusing to grant insurer mandamus relief after insured filed a suit in response to
insurer denying their claim).
102. Scott A. Brister & Mark A. Ticer, Panel at the Insurance Law Institute Conference:
Appraisal:
State
Farm
Lloyds
v.
Johnson,
What
Happened?
(Oct. 15,
2010),
https://utcle.org/conferences/IN10 [https://perma.cc/AS9X-CEEU]. During this CLE panel
discussion, Justice Brister explained:
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What if the insurer denies the claim based on an exclusion but decides
only after a lawsuit is filed that it would now also like to contest the amount
of the loss? As noted above, the purpose of appraisal is to permit either
party to save the cost and time of litigating a disagreement about the amount
of the loss.103 As the Johnson court explained:
[A]ppraisal is intended to take place before suit is filed; this Court and others
have held it is a condition precedent to suit. Appraisals require no attorneys,
no lawsuits, no pleadings, no subpoenas, and no hearings. It would be a rare
case in which appraisal could not be completed with less time and expense
than it would take to file motions contesting it.104

Creating an additional dispute about the amount of loss only after the
parties have gone to the courts would seem to defeat the entire purpose of

It depends on whether you see these through the glasses of this is like an arbitration which
comes up with a binding award that’s like engraved in stone and there’s nothing you can do about
it, or whether this is like a mediation where you come up with an answer and in half or three
quarters of the cases, that answer will be what the parties settle on, but then some of them,
somebody’s not going to like it, so you just disregard it and move on. My view is that it ought to
be more like the mediation model.
....
The judges who are going to be deciding this are a lot more comfortable with arbitration now
than they were in the 1930s. . . . [J]udges just didn’t want arbitration at all. And now it’s very
common in arbitration to have partisan arbitrators and judges and attorneys are used to that where
you pick somebody who you know is going to fight for you. . . . You can find cases, the old cases,
some of them say you know it’s like an arbitration award . . . you can’t undo it unless you show
there was . . . a bribe, but [there are] others that just say if you think they were just mistaken, you
can undo it, and I think . . . I put a line in the opinion to support [that] I think the latter ones are
right, that . . . if it’s going to be heavily binding it’s never going to be a quick, cheap, no-lawyersinvolved process. . . . If it’s something you can undo easily, . . . then the process will be quick
because you know you can undo it later, and why fight about it until you find out if you need to.
Id. at 13:45–14:10, 36:45–38:07.
103. Mark A. Ticer et al., Appraisal in the New World Order, 12 J. TEX. INS. L. 1, 7 (2013) (“[T]he
purposes of appraisal . . . is a prompt, efficient, and inexpensive method to determine the amount of
loss.”).
104. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Tex. 2009) (footnote omitted) (citing
Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 8 S.W. 630, 631–32 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1888); Am. Cent.
Ins. Co. v. Terry, 26 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1930, holding approved); Vanguard
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith, 999 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Providence
Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Crystal City Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994,
no writ)).
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appraisal.105 But this question remains open.
C. Selection of Umpires
Most appraisal clauses provide that the appraisers are to appoint a neutral
appraisal “umpire” to resolve any disagreements between the parties’
appointed appraisers.106 This neutral umpire breaks any deadlock and casts
the deciding vote on any continuing disagreements about the amount of the
loss.107 Many policies further provide that if the appraisers cannot agree
on who should act as the umpire, the parties may ask a judge of a judicial
district in the location where the loss occurred, or often “the judge of a court
having jurisdiction,” to appoint an umpire for them.108
However, courts have held this does not require the filing of any type of
pleadings invoking the judicial jurisdiction of the judge asked to appoint the
appraiser.109
Some counties have local rules that impose restrictions on access to a
court unless a suit or proceeding is first filed (and assigned to a particular
court or central docketing court) in accordance with the local rules.110
105. See id. (asserting the goal of appraisal is to determine the amount of loss before suit is filed);
see also Scottish Union, 8 S.W. at 631–32 (holding appraisal was a condition precedent to litigation).
106. See Cantu v. S. Ins. Co., No. 03-14-00533-CV, 2015 WL 5096858, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing the appointment of an umpire called for by many
appraisal clauses).
107. See id. (“If the appraisers do not agree on the amount of loss, they submit their differences
to the umpire, and only two of the three actors need to agree on the amount for the appraisal award
to become final.”).
108. See Floyd Circle Partners, LLC v. Republic Lloyds, No. 05-16-00224-CV, 2017 WL
3124469, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting “a judge of a court
having jurisdiction” may appoint an umpire for the parties); Cantu, 2015 WL 5096858, at *2 (explaining
parties may ask a judge to select an umpire if the appraisers cannot agree on one).
109. See Tex. Mun. League Joint Self-Insurance Fund v. Hous. Auth. of Alice, No. 04-15-00069CV, 2015 WL 5964182, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We agree
that the selection of an umpire by a judge in accordance with the terms of the Property Coverage
Document does not require the filing of a lawsuit of invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court.” (citing Barnes v. W. All. Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ
dism’d by agr.); Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. Ballard, 112 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. App.—Waco 1938, no writ);
In re Roberts Co., 128 S.E.2d 137, 138–39 (N.C. 1962) (per curiam))); see also In re Roberts, 128 S.E.2d
at 138 (“The appointment of the umpire is not the judgment of a court, it is a mere ministerial act
pursuant to contract . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., BEXAR (TEX.) CIV. DIST. CT. LOC. R. 3, 6 (“The Presiding Civil District Court
hears all nonjury matters, including pretrial matters in cases set for a jury trial, with the exception of
issues allocated to the Monitoring Judge under Rule 4. . . . Every request for relief from a civil district
court must be presented to the Presiding Court, with the exception of the uncontested matters
specified . . . .”).
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Courts might or might not characterize an umpire appointment as a request
for judicial relief that would be subject to these local rules.111
Either party can go to a judge who meets the contractual requirement as
the selector of the umpire and request an umpire be appointed without
being required to invoke the jurisdiction of that judge’s court.112 Moreover,
any judge that meets the contractual requirements may generally also
appoint a replacement umpire, when necessary, consistent with the language
and purpose of appraisal clauses.113
May a party or its appraiser go to the judge for appointment of an umpire
without notice? Given the lack of any of the ordinary procedural safeguards
that would accompany most judicial decisions (like service of citation), not
surprisingly, disagreements between appraisers have sometimes sent the
parties out seeking secret umpire appointments from a local, friendly
judge.114 Courts in other states have seen this tactic for what it is, and not
approved it. As one Kentucky court concluded:
Cahill’s counsel, without notice to appellant or its counsel, now applied to
the Hon. L. D. Greene, judge of the Jefferson circuit court, Common Pleas
branch No. 1, and suggested the appointment of Mr. C. T. Minor, and the
court made the appointment. The date of this appointment does not appear,
but it was within 48 hours after they were unable to agree . . . .
....
This award was not validly made. A proper tribunal was never set up. The
court had no power to act until after the expiration of fifteen days and should
not then have acted except after reasonable notice to appellant so that it could
be properly represented. True, the contract does not require notice, but the
law does.115

111. See, e.g., Tex. Mun. League, 2015 WL 5964182, at *2 (finding the selection of an umpire by a
judge did not invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court).
112. See id. (holding “the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction was not invoked” after a request
for appointment of an umpire).
113. See Cantu, 2015 WL 5096858, at *5 (holding the district court had authority to appoint a
replacement umpire pursuant to the contract between the parties).
114. See, e.g., Ballard, 112 S.W.2d at 533 (discussing how each party secured a secret umpire
appointment from different judges in two different counties).
115. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Cahill, 98 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Ky. 1936); see also Bos. Ins. Co. v.
A.H. Jacobson Co., 33 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 1948) (following Camden Fire Insurance).
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Similarly, in Caledonian Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,116 a California court
concluded that allowing such a tactic would create great confusion as both
parties “could simultaneously each procure the designation of an umpire,
without notice to the other, by a different person who held the office of
judge of some court of record” and obtain different, conflicting umpire
awards.117 However, a Wisconsin court in Cady Land Co. v. Philadelphia Fire
& Marine Insurance Co.118 held otherwise and upheld a secret umpire
appointment, concluding the contract simply had no provision requiring
notice before seeking out a judge to appoint an umpire.119 The only legal
question was whether enough time had passed from the time of the
disagreement for an umpire’s appointment to become necessary.120
This tactic has not been expressly addressed by a Texas court. It was at
issue in a petition for writ of mandamus filed in In re Amerisure Insurance
Co.,121 where the policyholder used the tactic to get an umpire appointed
without notice to the insurer, but the petition was denied without an opinion
by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas.122 In the
1938 Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia v. Ballard123 opinion from the Waco court, both
parties secured secret umpire appointments from different judges in
different counties.124 Deciding that only one county was proper under the
policy’s terms, the court upheld the appraisal award from the umpire who
was appointed by the judge in the county where the property was located.125
Having noted that both parties had attempted the same gamesmanship, the
court passed on the issue of whether such a tactic was appropriate: “Since
the parties have apparently waived any consideration of the manner in which
the appointment of the respective umpires was procured and the procedure

116. Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 295 P.2d 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
117. Id. at 50.
118. Cady Land Co. v. Phila. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 218 N.W. 814 (Wis. 1928).
119. See id. at 815 (“This provision does not by its language require that prior notice shall be
given of the intention by either party . . . .”).
120. See id. (holding the umpire appointment valid following the expiration of fifteen days
provided for in the contract).
121. In re Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 13-0723, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 1249, at *1 (Tex. Mar. 21, 2014)
(orig. proceeding).
122. See id. (denying petition for writ of mandamus).
123. Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. Ballard, 112 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.—Waco 1938, no writ).
124. See id. at 533 (discussing the parties appointment of separate appraisers).
125. See id. at 534 (upholding the appraisal award based upon the plaintiff’s residence).
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followed after such appointments, we have not considered the regularity or
validity of the same.”126
D. Scope: Which Parts of a Dispute Are Subject to Appraisal and Which Are Not?
Is causation a “liability” issue for the courts or an issue inextricably
intertwined with determining the “amount of loss” and subject to appraisal?
Is it sometimes one and sometimes the other? Justice Brister attempted to
answer this question in his opinion in Johnson, but seemingly failed, as
different parts of his opinion are still regularly cited by both sides in support
of “scope” arguments when insurers are moving to compel appraisal.127
In State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, Johnson made a claim on her policy after
suffering hail damage to her roof.128 State Farm’s adjuster found the loss
was less than Johnson’s $1,477 deductible.129 However, a roofer hired by
Johnson concluded the damage would cost more than $13,000 to repair.130
Johnson requested appraisal under the policy, but State Farm refused to
participate, arguing the dispute concerned “causation” rather than the
amount of loss.131 Johnson sued solely to obtain an order compelling State
Farm to participate in appraisal.132 The trial court refused appraisal, but
the court of appeals reversed.133 The Texas Supreme Court took the case
to attempt to resolve where “causation” disputes fit into coverage litigation
and the scope of appraisal.134
The court first noted the key distinction between arbitration and
appraisal.135 Arbitration concerns the parties’ liability and stands in place
of the courts’ jurisdiction, while appraisal only resolves the amount of the
loss, leaving the question of liability for that loss entirely to the courts.136
The dispute turned on the number of shingles that were damaged by the
126. Id. (citing Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Cahill, 98 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1936); Cady Land Co. v.
Phila. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 218 N.W. 814 (Wis. 1928)).
127. See generally State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009) (affirming the court
of appeal’s order granting summary judgment compelling State Farm to participate in the appraisal
process).
128. Id. at 887.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 887–88.
132. Id. at 888.
133. Id.
134. See id. (“We granted State Farm’s petition to decide whether the dispute here fell within
the scope of this appraisal clause.”).
135. See id. at 889–90 (noting previous distinctions between arbitration and appraisal).
136. See id. at 890 (“[T]he scope of appraisal is damages, not liability.”).
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covered hailstorm and needed to be replaced.137 State Farm’s argument
that this was a matter of “causation” not subject to appraisal was rejected
by the court: “A dispute about how many shingles were damaged and
needed replacing is surely a question for the appraisers. . . . What’s more,
either party could avoid appraisal by simply picking a few extras.”138
State Farm tried to argue the real dispute was not which shingles were
damaged, “but which [shingles] were damaged by hail.”139 The court initially
seemed to presume this would have been a valid argument, but rejected it
on the basis of the specific record in that case, concluding: “But nothing in
the summary judgment record establishes Johnson’s roof was damaged by
anything else. In State Farm’s denial letter, its summary judgment motion,
and even its briefs in this Court, there is neither evidence nor even a hint
about what else caused the damage.”140 Thus, the record did not establish
that there was any dispute about causation.141 That should have resolved
the case.
However, the court went on to discuss how it would handle the issue
even if it were a matter of “causation.”142 Foreshadowing the rest of the
opinion, the court begins by noting: “In the abstract, it is hard to say whether
causation is more a question of liability or damages.”143 The court then
proceeded to set forth a number of rules that are easy to state in the abstract
but often more difficult to apply to any particular dispute:
1. “[W]hen different causes are alleged for a single injury to
property, causation is a liability question for the courts.”144 The
example given is where appraisers disagreed about the cause of a
foundation movement, which the court agreed would be a
liability question, not an appraisal question.145
2. “[W]hen different types of damage occur to different items of
property, appraisers may have to decide the damage caused by
137. Id. at 891.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. (“[T]he trial court could not conclude as a matter of law that the parties’ dispute was
about causation rather than something else.”).
142. Id. at 891–93.
143. Id. at 892.
144. Id.
145. See id. (explaining the role of appraisers is to determine the cost of damage while leaving
the issue of deciding liability to the courts).
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each before the courts can decide liability.”146 The example
concerned water and mold damage under a policy in which the
former was covered but the latter excluded, and there was a
question as to how much property needed to be replaced because
of the excluded mold: “[C]ourts can decide whether water or
mold damage is covered, but if they can also decide the amount
of damage caused by each, there would be no damage questions
left for the appraisers.”147
3. “[W]hen the causation question involves separating loss due to a
covered event from a property’s [preexisting] condition. Wear
and tear is excluded in most property policies (including this one)
because it occurs in every case. If State Farm is correct that
appraisers can never allocate damages between covered and
excluded perils, then appraisals can never assess hail damage
unless a roof is brand new.”148
4. “[A]ppraisers must always consider causation, at least as an initial
matter. An appraisal is for damages caused by a specific
occurrence, not every repair a home might need. When asked to
assess hail damage, appraisers look only at damage caused by hail;
they do not consider leaky faucets or remodeling the kitchen. . . .
Any appraisal necessarily includes some causation element,
because setting the ‘amount of loss’ requires appraisers to decide
between damages for which coverage is claimed from damages
caused by everything else.”149
5. “[W]hen an indivisible injury to property may have several causes,
appraisers can assess the amount of damage and leave causation
up to the courts.”150
6. “When divisible losses are involved, appraisers can decide the
cost to repair each without deciding who must pay for it.”151

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 892–93.
149. Id. at 893.
150. Id. at 894.
151. Id. (citing Lundstrom v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87–89 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)).
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Some of these rules seem to facially contradict one another. For example,
the insurer’s appraiser decides that he is going to assess the value of a
damaged roof at $0 because he believes the roof was damaged by a prior
storm and not the recent hailstorm that occurred during the policy period.
The insured’s appraiser decides the damage resulted from the recent storm
and will cost $1 million to repair. This is an “indivisible injury to property
[that] may have several causes” which would leave the real question as one
of causation and not amount, but it is also a situation in which the “causation
question involves separating loss due to a covered event from a property’s
[preexisting] condition[,]” which the court considers a question for appraisal
and not a liability issue for the courts.152
Older cases seemed to be clearer on this distinction. In Wells v. American
States Preferred Insurance Co.,153 which is cited in Johnson, the appraisal award
specified the damages “related to the plumbing leak” were $0.154 In the
context of the award and the parties’ dispute about the loss, the court
interpreted this $0 valuation as turning on whether the plumbing leak was
the cause of the loss even though it was expressed in terms of dollar value,
and therefore a matter that was beyond the scope of the appraisal clause.155
In an opinion released in 2018, another court addressed this issue in the
context of a “named perils” policy that provided coverage only if the loss
was caused by windstorm or hail.156 In Texas Windstorm Insurance Ass’n v.
Dickinson Independent School District,157 the umpire and the school district’s
appraiser agreed to an appraisal award of nearly $10,000,000 for Hurricane
Ike-related damage to school properties.158 The school district was granted
summary judgment on “causation” and the amount of damages, and
judgment was ultimately entered against the insurer, Texas Windstorm
Insurance Association (TWIA), for breach of contract because it had not

152. Id. at 892, 894.
153. Wells v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ
denied).
154. Id. at 682.
155. Id. at 683.
156. See Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n v. Dickinson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-16-00474-CV,
2018 WL 4781526, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 4, 2018, no pet. h.) (“[The policy at
issue] explicitly excluded loss or damage caused by or resulting from ‘rain, whether driven by wind or
not unless wind or hail first makes an opening in the walls or roof of the described building.’”).
157. Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n v. Dickinson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-16-00474-CV, 2018 WL
4781526 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 4, 2018, no pet. h.).
158. Id. at *3.
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paid the appraisal award.159 TWIA argued the appraisal award by itself was
insufficient evidence to support the judgment because it only contained the
valuation of the damages and no causation analysis or other explanation
identifying any of that damage as having been caused by the two named
perils—windstorms or hail.160 TWIA also produced evidence that wind
and hail were not the only causes of damage they found to the school
properties.161 The “critical issue” therefore was whether the appraisal
award alone could establish the amount of covered loss suffered by the school
district.162 The court concluded that it could not establish liability as a
matter of law in the face of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact
as to how much of the damage found by the appraisers was caused by the
named perils covered under the policy.163 The case was reversed and
remanded.164
Ultimately, the question of “whether the appraisers have gone beyond the
damage questions entrusted to them will depend on the nature of the
damage, the possible causes, the parties’ dispute, and the structure of the
appraisal award.”165 This issue will likely continue to be regularly litigated,
both in the context of compelling cases to appraisal or avoiding appraisal
and enforcing or setting aside appraisal awards where one side or the other
claims the appraisers exceeded the scope of the appraisal clause, as occurred
in Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds,166 a 2016 San Antonio Court of Appeals
case.167
There may also be situations where it is completely ambiguous whether
the insurer’s refusal to pay any amount for a claim is based on a
disagreement about the amount of the loss, or a disagreement about
causation or the interpretation and application of the policy. For example,
if the carrier’s claim denial simply states the claim was denied because “we
found no evidence of any covered damages in an amount more than your
applicable deductible” but provides no further details, that “denial” of the
claim could be because (a) the insurer found some damage but not enough
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
court.”).
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at *4.
See id. at *8 (asserting that appraisal awards establish damages but not liability).
Id.
Id. at *9.
See id. at *11 (“Under the specific facts of this case, causation is a liability question for the
Id. at *13.
State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. 2009).
Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied).
Id. at 267.
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to exceed the deductible (which would be a disagreement about the amount
of the loss), or (b) it could be that the insurer found plenty of damage, but
considered all or most of it to be caused by non-covered losses (which
would be potentially a disagreement about causation or policy
interpretation). The Texas Insurance Code imposes a duty on carriers to
state the reasons for a rejection of a claim, but there is not much guidance
for what constitutes sufficiently detailed reasons.168
Justice Brister’s rules get even more complicated when the insurer’s
position on the amount it will pay for the claim combines both disagreements
about causation and disagreements about the amount of the loss. For
example, the insurer determines there are substantial amounts of hail
damage to a property. However, the insurer determines that most of the
repairs are due to hail damage caused prior to the policy period by a noncovered hailstorm, but then also concludes that the remaining damages that
are covered are less than the deductible, and on the basis of both of these
conclusions it pays nothing on the claim. Is that disagreement only partially
subject to appraisal? Would the umpire determine the amount of the loss
as to the portion of damages the insurer acknowledges is covered, leaving
the question of whether the remainder of the damage was caused by a
covered hailstorm for the courts?
In a seminar presentation sponsored by the Insurance Section of the State
Bar of Texas shortly after the Johnson opinion was published and its author’s
departure from the bench, Justice Brister explained his belief that the Johnson
opinion would be relatively uncontroversial because appraisals would
operate much like mediations, resolving only those simple cases not hotly
contested, while parties to more serious disputes would still get to litigate
liability for the loss, as well as to attack the validity or relevance of the result
of the appraisal in a jury trial.169 Of course, the court had not been tasked
with reviewing the Breshears rule or the “independent injury” rule at that
point.170
168. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.056(c) (“If the insurer rejects the claim, the notice
required . . . must state the reasons for the rejection.”).
169. See Brister & Ticer, supra note 102, at 13:45–14:10 (“[Y]ou come up with an answer and in
half or three quarters of the cases, that answer will be what the parties settle on, but then some of them,
somebody’s not going to like it, so you just disregard it and move on.”).
170. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995) (acknowledging “a general
rule [that] there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in
fact not covered[,]” but nevertheless recognizing “the possibility that in denying the claim, the insurer
may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim”); Breshears
v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op)
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IV. CHALLENGING AN APPRAISAL AWARD AFTER APPRAISAL
Once the appraisal process is complete and at least two of the three
appraisers (the two parties’ appointed appraisers and the “umpire”) have
agreed to the amount of the loss, that determination is binding on the parties
unless it can be legally set aside.171 There are several ways that appraisal
awards have been challenged after the fact, including accident, mistake,
fraud, the appraisal was outside the scope of or not in compliance with the
policy, and lack of authority.172 These arguments are often grouped
together into three categories: “(1) when the award was made without
authority; (2) when the award was made as a result of fraud, accident,
or mistake; or (3) when the award was not in compliance with the
requirements of the policy.”173 Whatever the basis, the party attempting to
avoid the award bears the burden of setting it aside and “every reasonable
presumption” will be indulged in favor of the appraisal award.174
A. Scope
“Scope” of the award is dealt with in the previous section of this paper
on invoking and avoiding appraisal, as it turns on the same issues often used
to try to avoid appraisal in the first place.175 Frequently, the central
question that arises in attempting to set aside an appraisal award is whether
the appraisers and umpire exceeded their authority in the sense that they
went beyond the limitations of the process and attempted to adjudicate
coverage or liability instead of merely the amount of the loss.176 As stated
(finding the insurers were entitled to summary judgment against the insureds’ breach of contract claim
because the insurers established proof of their participation and full compliance with the appraisal
process).
171. See Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 342 n.1 (discussing the terms of the appraisal provision present
in the insurance contract which states appraisal awards shall be binding on both parties if the process
of appraisal was followed properly).
172. See id. at 346 (“[A]n appraisal award is binding and enforceable unless the insured proves
that the award was unauthorized or the result of fraud, accident, or mistake.” (citing Barnes v. W. All.
Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ dism’d by agr.))).
173. See Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet.
denied) (citing Wells v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996,
writ denied); Providence Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Crystal City Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 S.W.2d 872, 875–76
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ)).
174. Providence Lloyds, 877 S.W.2d at 875 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Guerson, 93 S.W.2d 591,
594 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1936, writ dism’d)).
175. See discussion supra Section III.D.
176. See, e.g., Garcia, 514 S.W.3d at 265–69 (discussing whether appraisers acted outside the
scope of their authority); see also Wells, 919 S.W.2d at 683 (answering “whether the appraisal section of

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

29

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 1, Art. 5

130

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:101

above, this is a thorny question as to which the existing case law leaves few
definitive answers.
B. Lack of Umpire Authority
The umpire is not necessarily limited to siding with one appraiser or the
other.177 Rather, the umpire is supposed to exercise his or her own
independent judgment in determining the value of the loss.178 Thus, the
umpire is not constrained to the values the parties’ appointed appraisers
placed on the loss, but may determine the loss value at more or less than the
amounts determined by either of them.179
C. Impartiality and “Disinterestedness”
A second argument often raised in this context is a challenge that either
one party’s appointed appraiser or the umpire was not unbiased, competent,
disinterested, or otherwise independent.180 The burden of proof is
significant. “The showing of a [preexisting] relationship, without more,
does not support a finding of bias.”181 Cases finding a disqualifying interest
or bias tend to revolve around facts showing the appraiser had a particular
pecuniary interest in setting the value of the loss at a certain amount. For
example, in General Star Indemnity Co. v. Spring Creek Village Apartments Phase

the policy . . . authorized and empowered the appraisers to determine what caused or did not cause the
loss claimed”).
177. See Providence Lloyds, 877 S.W.2d at 877–78 (establishing an umpire is under no duty to
constrain his estimates to meet those of the appraisers).
178. See id. at 878 (“[It is] the duty of the umpire under the terms of the contract of insurance
to ascertain and determine, in the exercise of his own judgment and as the result of his own
investigation, the cost values of the disputed items, independent of the findings of the appraisers, or
either of them.”).
179. See id. at 876 (“The function of an umpire who is to act in matters of difference only is not
to coincide with one or the other of the appraisers, but he is to make his award independently of such
estimates.” (quoting Fisch v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 356 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston 1962, writ
ref’d n.r.e.))); Garcia, 514 S.W.3d at 268 (relying on Providence Lloyds).
180. See Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 786–87 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (challenging the validity of an appraisal award based on an
appraiser’s alleged bias, prejudice, and interest due to a preexisting relationship).
181. Id. at 786 (citing Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 255 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,
pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Gardner v. State Farm Lloyds, 76 S.W.3d 140, 143–44
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)); see also Gardner, 76 S.W.3d at 143–44 (explaining how
the evidence failed to establish a preexisting relationship between the insurer and the insurer’s
appraiser).
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V, Inc.,182 the insured’s appraiser was a contractor who had an agreement
under which his percentage of compensation would go up if the cost of
repair were over $2 million.183 The court found that, as an appraiser, he
had a direct pecuniary interest in assuring the loss was high enough to trigger
a bigger profit for his contracting business.184
However, other evidence that an appraiser was biased or prejudiced might
suffice. In an older opinion, the Texas Supreme Court, quoting from an
Alabama Supreme Court opinion, suggested a pecuniary interest was not
essential to show the appraiser was not disinterested.185 However,
distinguishing that case, a more recent opinion concluded the appraisers
need only meet whatever requirements are imposed by the policy and need
not be “disinterested” if all the policy required was that they be
“competent.”186
If there is room for arguments about bias aside from showing a direct
pecuniary interest, it appears to be construed narrowly. For instance, in
Gardner v. State Farm Lloyds,187 the insured argued the carrier’s appraiser—
Boudreaux—was not “independent” as required under their insurance
policy because of a preexisting business relationship between State Farm
and his employer, Haag Engineering.188 The record showed “(1) Haag
wrote a training program used by State Farm, about hail damage claims;
(2) Haag wrote numerous publications about hailstorm evaluations, and
served as a ‘consultant’ for State Farm on those matters; and (3) Haag was
182. Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Spring Creek Vill. Apartments Phase V, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 733
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
183. Id. at 738.
184. See id. at 737 (“An appraiser with a financial interest in the outcome of the appraisal is not
impartial.” (citing Del. Underwriters v. Brock, 211 S.W. 779, 780–81 (Tex. 1919))); see also Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 466 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 1991) (“The appointment of an appraiser
with a concealed pecuniary interest in the outcome is a sufficient ground for voiding the award as a
matter of law without a showing of prejudice.” (citing Edwards v. Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis.,
132 S.E.2d 39, 42 (Ga. 1963); Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Soc’y, 97 N.W. 875,
876 (Minn. 1904); Orr v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 201 S.W.2d 952, 954–57 (Mo. 1947))).
185. See Brock, 211 S.W. at 780–81 (“For the term ‘disinterested’ ‘does not mean simply lack of
pecuniary interest, but requires the appraiser to be not biased or prejudiced.’” (quoting Hall Bros. v.
W. Assur. Co., 32 So. 257, 258 (Ala. 1902))).
186. See Tex. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sampley, No. 07-13-00151-CV, 2015 WL 3463028,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op) (finding no legal requirement that “every
appraiser appointed under a Texas insurance policy have the attribute of disinterestedness, regardless
of the policy’s language” and distinguishing competence from “disinterestedness”).
187. Gardner v. State Farm Lloyds, 76 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
188. Id. at 143–44.
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paid by various State Farm companies for assignments across the United
States over seven years.”189 This was insufficient to raise a fact issue about
whether the appraiser lacked independence.190 The court explained:
[The insured] presented no evidence that State Farm influenced or exercised
control over Boudreaux. There [was] no evidence that Boudreaux ever was
an employee of State Farm or had a financial interest in the claim. None of
their evidence relate[d] to Boudreaux, the [insureds’] claim, or the particular
hailstorm. Instead, their evidence involve[d] an arm’s length business
relationship, which [was] unrelated to [their] specific claim, between various
State Farm companies and Haag.191

Similarly, in Franco v. Slavonic Mutual Fire Insurance Ass’n,192 the insured
argued the appraisal award should be set aside because the insurer’s
appraiser was an “interested, prejudiced, and biased appraiser, due to his
status as an investigating engineer” on the same claim but for another
insurer, “and the fact that he already had issued a report containing his
opinions regarding the scope of [the] damages and coverage prior to his
appointment as appraiser.”193 The court found this was insufficient to raise
a fact issue regarding disqualifying bias, reasoning the appraiser was not an
employee of the insurer and his “report and conclusions regarding the cause
of the plumbing leak were his own.”194 Because the insured presented “no
evidence suggesting that [the insurer] influenced or exercised control” over
the appraiser, or that he “had a financial interest in Franco’s claim[,]” there
was no fact issue sufficient to challenge the award.195
Other courts have suggested the standard might be met merely by
showing an “error resulting in the award is so great as to be indicative of
gross partiality, undue influence, or corruption.”196 Where there is some
evidence to support a claim that an appraiser or umpire was not qualified to
meet the policy’s requirements, however, it has often been treated as a fact
189. Id. at 143.
190. Id. at 144.
191. Id. at 143.
192. Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, no pet.).
193. Id. at 785.
194. Id. at 787.
195. Id.
196. Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 269–70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet.
denied) (quoting Barnes v. W. All. Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ
dism’d by agr.)).
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issue for a jury.197 Importantly, once it is established that the party relying
on the appraisal award appointed a biased appraiser, Texas courts have
generally held that the party has waived the right to appraisal.198
D. Accident or Mistake
In the appraisal context, a “mistake” is often described as “a situation
where the appraisers and umpire were laboring under a mistake of fact by
which their appraisal award was made to operate in a way they did not
intend, such that the award does not speak the intention of the appraisers
and umpire[.]”199 The main question is not whether the appraisal award
was correct or incorrect in amount, but whether the amount stated in the
award is what the appraisers intended it to be.200
V. EFFECT ON CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, BAD FAITH,
AND VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
One of the biggest issues in Texas insurance coverage litigation is the
question of what the relationship is between the appraisal process and the
claims adjusting process, and what effect appraisal has on claims for breach
of contract, common law and statutory bad faith, and violation of the Texas
Prompt Payment of Claims Act (PPCA). Is appraisal a dispute resolution
mechanism that comes into play only after the claim has been investigated
and adjusted by the insurer, or is it a device that is itself part of the claims
adjusting process that values the claim rather than resolves a disagreement?
197. See Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Spring Creek Vill. Apartments Phase V, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 733,
735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“Because we find fact issues with regard to
whether Spring Creek’s appraiser was impartial, we reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.”); Providence Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Crystal City Indep. Sch. Dist., 877 S.W.2d
872, 876 n.5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (“The jury was asked whether it found from a
preponderance of the evidence that the [appraisal] award should be set aside because of fraud, accident,
or mistake.” (alteration in original) (citing Barnes, 844 S.W.2d at 268)); Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. W.T.
Waggoner Estate, 39 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1931, judgm’t affirmed) (“This issue being
properly raised, the question as to the competency or disinterestedness of an appraiser is primarily for
the jury.”).
198. See Del. Underwriters v. Brock, 211 S.W. 779, 782 (Tex. 1919) (holding insurer’s
appointment of a biased appraiser constituted a waiver).
199. Garcia, 514 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting Barnes, 844 S.W.2d at 268).
200. See id. at 269–70 (stating that the issue was the intention of the appraisers); MLCSV10 v.
Stateside Enters., 866 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“A court may set aside an award on the
ground of mistake [or accident] only ‘upon a showing that the award does not speak the intention of
the appraisers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting JM Walker LLC v. Acadia Ins. Co., 356 F. App’x 744,
746 (5th Cir. 2009))).
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Confusion about this fundamental question underlies the central issue that
has brought appraisal to the forefront of Texas coverage litigation.
A. The Breshears Rule
In Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds,201 homeowners gave notice of a loss for
plumbing leaks under their policy with State Farm.202 State Farm valued
the loss at $18,742, and the homeowners disagreed with whether the amount
was enough for the repairs.203 Suit was filed but abated while the
disagreement went through appraisal where the appraisers and umpire
agreed the amount of the loss was actually $21,484.204 State Farm paid the
difference within thirty days of the appraisal award.205 Both sides moved
for summary judgment, with State Farm taking the position that the amount
of the loss was determined by the appraisal and therefore there was no
breach of the contract and by extension no possible breach of the Insurance
Code.206 The Breshears argued the appraisal award established as a matter
of law that State Farm had breached the contract when it undervalued the
claim when the claim was handled.207 The trial court granted State Farm’s
motion and the court of appeals affirmed.208
1.

Breach of Contract

In support of their position that payment of an appraisal award did not
foreclose a claim for breach of contract, the Breshears relied on the
following language from In re Allstate County Mutual Insurance,209 wherein the
court was justifying mandamus relief from the denial of appraisal:
[I]f the appraisal determines that the vehicle’s full value is what the insurance
company offered, there would be no breach of contract. Accordingly, at a
minimum, denying the appraisals will vitiate the defendants’ ability to defend
the breach of contract claim. Because the appraisals go to the heart of the

201. Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004,
pet. denied) (mem. op).
202. Id. at 342.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 342–43.
207. Id. at 343.
208. Id. at 341.
209. In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding).
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plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, we need not decide here the significance
of the appraisals to each of the remaining claims.210

The Breshears court characterized this as dicta from the Allstate court and
concluded that because the Breshears’ policy with State Farm specified the
“appraisal process was the remedy for any disagreement regarding the
amount of loss,” there simply could be no breach of contract where the
insurer timely paid the appraisal award.211
2.

Bad Faith

The Breshears court also affirmed summary judgment denying the
homeowners’ bad faith claims under then Article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code (now codified in Chapter 541).212 In so doing, the court
found there was evidence that the amount originally paid by the insurer was
reasonable and based on average repair costs from local contractors’
estimates obtained at the time of the payment.213 The Breshears presented
no evidence that State Farm’s method of using average costs was
unreasonable, “or that the average cost State Farm calculated in their case
was itself unreasonable.”214 Thus, the court concluded there was no
evidence to support a statutory bad faith claim.215
3.

PPCA

The Breshears court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of State
Farm on the homeowners’ claim for violations of the Prompt Payment of
Claims Act, then Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code (now codified
in Chapter 542 Subchapter B).216 Without specifically addressing the
statutory language, the court concluded:
The Breshears argue that because of the appraisal process, they were not
actually paid until after State Farm paid them the difference between the first
210. In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d at 196.
211. Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 344.
212. See id. at 346 (“Therefore, denial of the Breshears’ motion for summary judgment was
proper as they have failed to establish an article 21.21 violation against State Farm.”); see generally TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 541 (dealing with unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practice).
213. Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 345–46.
214. Id. at 346.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 345; see generally INS. § 542.051–.061 (dealing with the prompt payment of claims).
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payment and the appraisal award, which occurred long after the sixty-day
statutory limit. . . . We disagree. . . . The fact that the appraisal process was
later invoked does not alter the fact that State Farm complied with the
insurance code, and provided a reasonable payment within a reasonable
time.217

B. Franco v. Slavonic
Two months after the opinion in Breshears, another court issued a similar
opinion precluding any further recovery following appraisal. In Franco v.
Slavonic Mutual Fire Insurance Ass’n, the homeowner received a coverage
payment from her insurer in the amount of $3,680 actual cash value for
damages from a covered plumbing leak.218 The homeowner invoked the
appraisal process, which resulted in an appraisal umpire’s actual cash value
award in the amount of $6,902.219 The insurer paid the balance of the
award to the homeowner, who proceeded with a breach of contract
action.220 The court held that since the appraisal award was agreed to be
“binding” regarding disagreements about the amount of the loss, the
homeowner was “estopped” from claiming there had been any breach of
the contract when the insurer timely paid the appraisal award.221 As in
Breshears, the court did not affirm summary judgment on the statutory bad
faith claim merely on the basis that the appraisal award was paid, but because
there was no evidence of any bad faith at the time of the original, deficient

217. Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 345; see also Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840,
847 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (“As this court has recognized, full and timely
payment of an appraisal award under the policy precludes an award of penalties under the Insurance
Code’s prompt payment provisions as a matter of law.”); In re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d
556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding), overruled on other grounds, In re Universal
Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 405–07 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (“Texas courts
considering the issue have concluded that full and timely payment of an appraisal award under the
policy precludes an award of penalties under the Insurance Code’s prompt payment provisions as a
matter of law.” (citing Amine v. Liberty Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., No. 01-06-00396-CV, 2007 WL
2264477, * 4 (Tex. App.—Houston. [1st Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); De La Garza v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 29, 32–33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005), supp. op. on reh'g,
181 S.W.3d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied); Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 344–45)).
218. Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
219. Id. at 780–81.
220. Id. at 781.
221. Id. at 787.
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payment.222 The homeowner apparently raised no complaint on appeal
regarding their PPCA claims.223
C. Breshears & “Independent Injury”
Since Breshears and Franco, the timely payment of an appraisal award has
generally been construed to preclude any liability for breach of contract,
statutory bad faith, or violation of the PPCA as a matter of law, regardless
of whether there is evidence of bad faith in the original handling of the claim
prior to appraisal.224 However, the reasons for precluding claims for bad
faith have been expanded from the “no evidence” rationale applied in
Breshears and Franco, combining the rule from Breshears with the
“independent injury” rule and thereby making the timely payment of an
appraisal award a complete defense as a matter of law to all claims against
an insurer based on the insurer’s conduct investigating or paying the claim
prior to appraisal.225
For instance, in the Fifth Circuit case Blum’s Furniture Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds London,226 a furniture store sustained damage from
Hurricane Ike in September 2008, and over the next year received two
payments totaling $350,000 from its insurer.227 Blum’s requested appraisal
and filed suit.228 The appraisal resulted in an umpire’s award exceeding
$1 million.229 Following Breshears and Franco, the Fifth Circuit upheld
222. See id. at 788 (“[T]here is no evidence raising a fact issue about [insurer’s] compliance with
the time deadlines imposed by article 21.55.”).
223. Id.
224. See generally Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (finding that an insurer’s full and timely payment of appraisal award
precludes as a matter of law any award for breach of contract, penalty interest, or any statutory or
common-law bad faith violations).
225. See Floyd Circle Partners, LLC v. Republic Lloyds, No. 05-16-00224-CV, 2017 WL
3124469, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Where a plaintiff’s claim
for breach of an insurance contract fails, to prevail on an action for violations of chapter 541 of the
insurance code, the plaintiff must show either that the insured failed to timely investigate the claim or
that the insurer committed an extreme act that caused an injury independent of the policy claim.”
(citing Bernstien v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 05-13-01533-CV, 2015 WL 3958282, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, No. 14-0721, 2017 WL
1311752, at *11–12 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2017), superseded by USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d
479 (Tex. 2018))).
226. Blum’s Furniture Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, 459 F. App’x 366
(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
227. Id. at 367.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.230 However, rather
than focus on the evidence supporting a bad faith claim, the Blum’s court
relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions in Republic Insurance Co. v.
Stoker231 and Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin232 to conclude that
because there was no breach of contract, there could not be any bad
faith.233
Thus, while both Breshears and Franco left open the possibility that an
insured could produce evidence that an underpayment was made in bad faith
violation of the Insurance Code, even in the absence of a breach of contract,
the Fifth Circuit combined the Breshears rule with what is often called the
“independent injury” rule based on Stoker to effectively eliminate any bad
faith claim as a matter of law, regardless of whether there was evidence that
the claim was underpaid in bad faith.234 This modified rule has been
followed by several cases since—applying the Breshears rule to preclude any
claim for breach of contract as a matter of law, and combining that rule with
the “independent injury” rule to preclude any bad faith claim as a matter of
law.235
230. Id. at 369.
231. Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995).
232. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996).
233. Blum’s Furniture, 459 F. App’x at 369.
234. See id. at 368 (“The only recognized exceptions to this rule are if the insurer ‘commit[s]
some act, so extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim,’ or fails ‘to timely
investigate the insured’s claim.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341)).
235. See, e.g., Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 277 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016,
pet. denied) (“[I]n order to avoid summary judgment on her common law bad faith claim, Garcia had
the burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact that appellees ‘commit[ed] some act, so extreme,
that would cause injury independent of the policy claim’ or failed to timely investigate her claim.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341)). See also Biasatti v. GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co.,
No. 07-17-00044-CV, 2018 WL 3946352, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16, 2018, pet. filed)
(finding the insured “has not demonstrated that any policy benefits were withheld, nor has it shown
damages from any injury independent of its policy claim” (footnote omitted)); Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840, 847–848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (determining
the insured was “precluded from maintaining his prompt payment claim as a matter of law” and “has
not alleged any act so extreme as to cause independent injury” (citing USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v.
Menchaca, No. 14-0721, 2017 WL 1311752, at *11–12 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2017), superseded by USAA Tex.
Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2018); Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d
919, 922 (Tex. 2005); Cantu v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 7:14-CV-456, 2016 WL 5372542, at *8 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 26, 2016); Alvarado v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 7:14-CV-166, 2016 WL 6905865, at *4–5
(S.D. Tex. June 15, 2016))); Floyd Circle Partners, LLC v. Republic Lloyds, No. 05-16-00224-CV,
2017 WL 3124469, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reasoning that
there must be an independent injury for a bad faith claim); Anderson v. Am. Risk Ins. Co., No. 01-1500257-CV, 2016 WL 3438243, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
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D. Isn’t This Like What Happens With UM/UIM Claims?
Underlying these opinions—particularly Breshears and Franco—is the idea
that the appraisal process is not a dispute resolution procedure but rather
the contractually agreed process for actually determining the value of the
claim. In that sense, one would expect it to be treated the same way that
claims are treated for purposes of Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist
(UM/UIM) coverage. If so, one would expect the Supreme Court of Texas
to treat appraisal the same way it treats UM/UIM claims. But it has not
done so.
Had the Texas Supreme Court believed that a property insurance claim
could be adjusted through appraisal instead of the insurer’s existing
common law and statutory duty to investigate and promptly pay covered
losses, the court would have reached a very different result in both In re
Allstate and In re Universal Underwriters. Indeed, if appraisal were just part of
the claims adjusting process as the Breshears rule presumes, the Supreme
Court of Texas would have dismissed all of the breach of contract and bad
faith claims in both In re Allstate and In re Universal Underwriters just like it did
in Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.236 Instead, the court has
explained—twice—that appraisal determines “whether” the contract has
been breached, and that the outcome of an appraisal will go to the “heart”
of the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim; both times the court also
acknowledged that the “bad faith” claims need not even be abated pending
appraisal.237
In a UM/UIM case, the “insurer is obligated to pay damages which the
insured is ‘legally entitled to recover’ from the underinsured motorist.”238
The court explained the unique attribute of UIM coverage that exempted it
from the general contractual duty to investigate losses and pay coverage
benefits:

op.) (stating that an insured cannot maintain a bad faith claim unless there is a breach of contract or
an independent injury).
236. See Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 819 (Tex. 2006) (dismissing the
breach of contract and bad faith claims).
237. See In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 412 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (stating the appraisal clause determines whether the contract has been breached and thus
“if the appraisal determined that the full value was what the insurer offered, there would be no breach
of contract”); In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (“As
to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the parties have agreed in the contracts’ appraisal clause to
the method by which to determine whether a breach has occurred.”).
238. Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06–1(5)).
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The UIM contract is unique because, according to its terms, benefits are
conditioned upon the insured’s legal entitlement to receive damages from a
third party. Unlike many first-party insurance contracts, in which the policy
alone dictates coverage, UIM insurance utilizes tort law to determine
coverage. Consequently, the insurer’s contractual obligation to pay benefits
does not arise until liability and damages are determined.239

From this, it logically follows that a “UIM insurer is under no contractual
duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judgment establishing the
liability and underinsured status of the other motorist. Neither requesting
UIM benefits nor filing suit against the insurer triggers a contractual duty to
pay.”240 Thus, after Brainard there could be no breach of contract without
a judicial determination of the tortfeasors’ liability, which was the only way
for the UIM carrier to determine how much it owed under the policy.241
Contrast this with what the court said and did in In re Allstate and In re
Universal Underwriters, where the Supreme Court of Texas not only explained
that the outcome of the appraisal went to the “heart” of the breach of
contract case and determined “whether” the contract had been breached,
but also refused to abate the bad faith claims against the insurer pending the
outcome of the appraisal.242 If the court had understood appraisal to be
the means by which an insurer determines the amount of coverage
obligation rather than a dispute resolution mechanism, it would have
reached a similar result as it had in Brainard, where the court found there
simply could be no breach of contract claim regardless of how much the
coverage obligation turned out to be after an adversarial proceeding.243 An
adversarial proceeding was the only means by which the amount of the loss
could be determined where the coverage amount depended on the “liability”
of the underinsured motorist.244 The Texas Supreme Court also would
likely have found error in the trial court’s refusal to abate the bad faith
239. Id. (citing Henson v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 17 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 2000)).
240. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Henson, 17 S.W.3d at 653–54).
241. Id. (affirming there is no claim for UIM benefits until a judgment establishing negligence
of an uninsured motorist).
242. See In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 412 n.5 (stating that the failure “to abate is not
subject to mandamus”); In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 196 (“[T]he proceedings need not be abated
while the appraisal goes forward.”).
243. See Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818 (“Where there is no contractual duty to pay, there is no just
amount owed.”).
244. See id. (“[N]either a settlement nor an admission of liability from the tortfeasor establishes
UIM coverage, because a jury could find that the other motorist was not at fault or award damages that
do not exceed the tortfeasor’s liability insurance.” (citing Henson, 17 S.W.3d at 654)).
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litigation against Allstate and Universal Underwriters pending appraisal, as
courts have done in UIM cases in light of Brainard.245
It would seem that—at least in the Supreme Court of Texas, and
consistent with the language of typical appraisal clauses and the long history
of the purpose of these clauses—appraisal is not the device by which an
insurer values the claim as adversarial trials are in the UM/UIM context, but
rather an extra-judicial alternative dispute resolution mechanism that applies
only after the insurer has already determined the amount of the loss in the
claims adjusting process, and the parties now disagree about that
determination.
E. USAA v. Menchaca and the Near Future
The Texas Supreme Court has not directly addressed the Breshears rule,
though it has recently requested full briefing on the merits in the petition
for review proceeding arising from Barbara Technologies Corp. v. State Farm
Lloyds,246 which appears to be limited solely to the issue of whether a PPCA
claim survives after the payment of an appraisal award.247 The court has
also requested merits briefing in Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds,248 where the issue
is limited to the “independent injury” question of whether a statutory bad
faith claim can survive the payment of an appraisal award.249 A petition
was also filed in National Security Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hurst,250 and the court
has recently requested briefing on the merits in that case as well, which raises

245. See, e.g., In re United Fire Lloyds, 327 S.W.3d 250, 256 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig.
proceeding) (finding error in the trial court’s refusal to abate bad faith claims against UIM carrier
pending a trial to determine underinsured motorists’ liability).
246. Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 04-16-00420-CV, 2017 WL 1423714
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 19, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
247. See id. at *2 (considering the legal question of whether a PPCA claim can be sustained when
the insurer has paid an appraisal award).
248. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 04-17-00252-CV, 2017 WL 5162315 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
249. Id. Similar petitions for review in two other State Farm cases were filed. Lazos v. State
Farm Lloyds, No. 04-17-00286-CV, 2018 WL 521585 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 24, 2018, pet.
filed) (mem. op.); Alvarez v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 04-17-00251-CV, 2018 WL 340135 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Jan. 10, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.). At the time of this writing the Supreme Court of
Texas has requested a response to the petitions in Lazos and Alvarez, but has not requested briefing on
the merits.
250. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hurst, 523 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, pet. filed).
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all three claims: breach of contract, PPCA, and bad faith.251
However, the Texas Supreme Court has recently addressed the language
from Akin and Stoker, often relied on as the basis for the “independent
injury” rule, and narrowed the application of the rule in USAA Texas Lloyds
Co. v. Menchaca.252 The issue was not addressed with reference to appraisal,
but with regard to the more general question of whether underpaid policy
benefits can be “actual damages” for purposes of a statutory bad faith claim
even in the absence of some separate independent injury—the court
concluded they can.253 The Menchaca court also described a number of
scenarios in which a claim for bad faith insurance handling might go forward
even if there was not technically any breach of the contract.254
Menchaca casts serious doubt on the independent injury rule as it was
applied in cases like Blum’s, Garcia, Ortiz, and Hurst, and opens the possibility
of a bad faith claim where there is sufficient evidence of bad faith
underpayment during the claims handling process, even if the insurer
eventually paid what it owed after an appraisal award.255

251. See generally id. at 849 (holding “that an insured cannot defeat an otherwise valid and binding
appraisal award simply by refusing to accept the insurer’s payment of the award or by asserting extracontractual claims that are derivative of the policy claim”).
252. See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 489–500, 521 (Tex. 2018)
(analyzing Akin and Stoker and clarifiying “that a plaintiff does not have to prevail on a separate breachof-contract claim to recover policy benefits for a statutory violation”).
253. See id. at 494 (permitting the insured to recover actual damages for an insurer’s statutory
violation if the insured has a right to benefits under the policy).
254. See id. at 491 (“[S]ome acts of bad faith, such as failure to properly investigate a claim or an
unjustifiable delay in processing a claim, do not necessarily relate to the insurer’s breach of its contractual
duties to pay covered claims, and may give rise to different damages.” (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. Co.
v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 n.3 (Tex. 1995))).
255. Compare id. at 499 (“[I]f an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury independent of the
insured’s right to recover policy benefits, the insured may recover damages for that injury even if the
policy does not entitle the insured to receive benefits.” (citing Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d
338, 341 (Tex. 1995))), with Hurst, 523 S.W.3d at 848 (“In order to recover any damages beyond policy
benefits, the statutory violation or bad faith must cause an injury that is independent from the loss of
benefits.” (citing USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, No. 14-0721, 2017 WL 1311752, at *11–12
(Tex. Apr. 7, 2017), superseded by Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479)), Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d
257, 277 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (“[G]arcia had the burden to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that appellees ‘commit[ed] some act, so extreme, that would cause injury
independent of the policy claim’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker,
903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995))), and Blum’s Furniture Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds
London, 459 F. App’x 366, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[I]n most circumstances, an insured may
not prevail on a bad faith claim without first showing that the insurer breached the contract.” (quoting
Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996))).
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If or when the Texas Supreme Court writes directly about this issue, there
are several possible outcomes, though only one of these would be consistent
with the court’s current jurisprudence describing the function and role of
appraisal, the court’s recent opinions in Menchaca, and the language of the
Insurance Code.
1. The court could treat the timely payment of appraisal awards as
a complete defense as a matter of law to all statutory and
common law claims against the insurer, even if the evidence
demonstrates bad faith at the time the claim was investigated and
adjusted. This is essentially the Breshears plus “independent
injury” rule.256 This would preclude any recovery of interest or
attorneys’ fees, regardless of how or why the insurer underpaid
the amount of the loss when the claim was originally investigated
and paid.257 It also would provide a direct financial incentive for
insurers to deliberately underpay claims and to shift the cost of
investigating the amount of the loss onto the insured, since the
insurer will never have to pay more than it should have paid when
the claim was originally handled, even if evidence shows the
insurer deliberately refused to investigate or pay a covered claim
in reliance on its appraisal clause.258 This incentive could be
particularly problematic in the future as some Texas courts have
also allowed unilateral appraisal clauses that can only be invoked
by the insurer—effectively forcing the insured to file a lawsuit
solely to get to the appraisal.259 This result would also be
difficult to reconcile with the court’s opinions in Menchaca placing
limitations on the “independent injury” rule, or with the plain
language of the PPCA, which provides no exceptions to its
statutory deadlines for appraisal.260
256. See generally Blum’s Furniture, 459 F. App’x 366 (applying Breshears and Stoker).
257. See, e.g., Hurst, 523 S.W.3d at 843, 849 (reversing trial court’s judgment awarding, among
other things, interest and attorney’s fees).
258. Cf. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 495 (“[A]n insurer’s statutory violation permits an insured to
receive only those ‘actual damages’ that are ‘caused by’ the violation . . . .”).
259. See In re GuideOne Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 07-15-00281-CV, 2015 WL 5766496, at *3
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[W]e note that there is not a case
cited by [insured] where the Texas Supreme Court or any intermediate appellate court has held an
appraisal clause that can only be instituted by the insurance company to be against public policy.”).
260. See generally TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.053 (listing exceptions to the PPCA); Menchaca,
545 S.W.3d at 494 (finding “the insured does not also have to prevail on a separate breach-of-contract

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

43

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 1, Art. 5

144

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:101

2. The court could treat the timely payment of appraisal awards as
a defense as a matter of law to a claim for breach of contract but
permit a statutory or common law claim to proceed against the
insurer where the policyholder can produce sufficient evidence
to support a claim for bad faith. This is how the issue was
implicitly addressed in Breshears and Franco, and would be
consistent with how the court wrote about the “independent
injury” rule in Menchaca.261 This would allow additional recovery
to an insured who demonstrates the insurer effectively used the
appraisal process in bad faith to delay paying the claim or shifting
the cost of the investigation onto the policyholder, including the
statutory remedies available under Chapter 541 of the Insurance
Code, and at least partially take away the incentive created by the
rule discussed in point 1, above.262 It would not be consistent
with the court’s prior description of appraisal as going to the
“heart” of a breach of contract action263 or with the court’s long
history of characterizing appraisal as “leaving the question of
liability for such loss to be determined, if necessary, by the
courts.”264
3. The court could preclude any claim for breach of contract or bad
faith as a matter of law but permit the recovery of attorneys’ fees

claim based on the insurer’s failure to pay those benefits” if it is found that the insured had a right to
benefits under the policy).
261. See Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499 (recognizing exceptions to the timely payment of appraisal
awards defense for insurers); see also Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op) (discussing how the insurer “acted in good faith and
conducted a reasonable investigation in response to their claim”); Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins.
Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 790 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of the insurer because there was no evidence to show the insurer acted in bad faith).
262. See generally TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541 (defining and prohibiting unfair methods of
competition and deceptive acts within the business of insurance); see also Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499
(allowing insured to recover damages for bad faith claim if damages are independent from the insurer’s
statutory violation).
263. See In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 412 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (“[D]enying the appraisal would vitiate the insurer’s right to defend its breach of contract
claim.” (citing In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)));
In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 196 (“Because the appraisals go to the heart of the plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claim, we need not decide here the significance of the appraisals to each of the remaining
claims.”).
264. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Scottish Union
& Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 8 S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1888)).
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and penalties under the PPCA, calculating the penalty to run
from the time the claim was originally supposed to be paid under
the PPCA deadlines up through the date the insurer paid the
appraisal award. This is a statutory interpretation question and is
essentially the issue raised in the Barbara Technologies case that is
currently pending in the Supreme Court of Texas.265 This result
would somehow have to be harmonized with the court’s opinions
in Menchaca and its prior characterizations of the limited scope
and role of appraisal in coverage litigation.266
4. The court could preclude claims for breach of contract but
permit a claim for violation of the PPCA as in point 3, above, and
leave open the possibility of a statutory or common law bad faith
claim as in point 2, where the evidence supports such a claim.267
5. Finally, the court could confirm that the only effect of an
appraisal award is to determine the specific factual issue of the
amount of the loss, leaving all of the legal effects of that factual
determination for the court to resolve. For instance, where the
amount of the loss is determined to be more than the insurer paid
when it investigated and adjusted the loss, a trial court could find
the insurer breached the contract as a matter of law by failing to
pay the amounts owed under the policy. By contrast, where the
appraisal award is equal to or less than the amount the insurer
paid, absent unusual circumstances, a court could find there was
no breach of contract as a matter of law. This would be
consistent with the court’s characterization of appraisal from its
1892 opinion in Scottish Union through its 2011 opinion in In re
Universal Underwriters.268 It would also be consistent with the
265. See Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 04-16-00420-CV, 2017 WL 1423714,
at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 19, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“Barbara Technologies argues
that the trial court erred in granting State Farm’s summary judgment motion because its TPPCA claim
survived State Farm’s invocation of the appraisal process and its payment of the appraisal award.”).
266. Cf. id. (“In reaching this holding, we relied on a long line of cases holding that a full and
timely payment of an appraisal award under the policy precludes an insured from recovering penalties
under the TPPCA as a matter of law.” (citing Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied))).
267. Cf. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499 (finding an insured may recover damages truly independent
from a breach of contract claim).
268. See In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 412 (“[I]f the appraisal determined that the
full value was what the insurer offered, there would be no breach of contract.” (citing In re Allstate Cty.,
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court’s holdings in Menchaca, substantially limiting the
“independent injury” rule by permitting a bad faith claim to
proceed in those cases where the evidence supports such a cause
of action for one of the types of actual damages outlined in
Menchaca.269 Finally, it would be consistent with the plain
language setting forth the statutory deadlines to investigate and
pay covered claims under the PPCA, and consistent with that
statute’s express requirement that it be construed liberally to
“promote the prompt payment of insurance claims.”270
VI. OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Abatement
One commonly litigated procedural issue concerns the effect of a pending
appraisal on an ongoing lawsuit where the policyholder has already filed suit
prior to appraisal. This was a secondary issue addressed by the court in both
In re Allstate271 and In re Universal Underwriters.272
In its first opinion on the subject, the court concluded that the denial of
an abatement was not subject to mandamus, but the timing of the case and
the appraisal were matters entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.273
Nevertheless, the court further concluded a case “need not be abated”
pending appraisal.274 In its second opinion, the issue was relegated to a
footnote, where the court simply cited In re Allstate.275
85 S.W.3d at 196)); Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 18 S.W. 439, 441 (Tex. 1892) (per
curiam) (finding the insurer was “endeavoring to ascertain the amount of damage, while the [insured]
declined to comply with the conditions in the policy on which alone his right to recover depends”).
269. See Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 521 (“[A] plaintiff does not have to prevail on a separate
breach-of-contract claim to recover policy benefits for a statutory violation . . . .”).
270. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.054.
271. See In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 195 (“After plaintiffs filed suit, the insurance companies
answered and then filed a plea in abatement and motion to invoke appraisal.”).
272. See In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 406 (“Grubbs sued Universal . . . . In
response, Universal invoked the policy’s appraisal clause . . . .”).
273. See In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 196 (“While the trial court’s denial of the motion to
invoke appraisal was error, the failure to grant the motion to abate is not subject to mandamus.” (citing
Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985))).
274. Id.
275. See In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 412 n.5 (“The trial court’s failure to grant the
motion to abate is not subject to mandamus, and the proceedings need not be abated while the appraisal
goes forward.” (citing In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 196)).
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Prior to In re Universal Underwriters, one court held it was an abuse of
discretion not to abate the case where the appraisal clause was a “condition
precedent” to suit.276 While the In re Universal Underwriters court overruled
In re Slavonic as to the latter’s discussion of what constitutes a waiver, it said
nothing about the lower court’s opinion that abatement was mandatory
where the appraisal was a condition precedent.277 Still, the Houston Court
of Appeals read In re Universal Underwriters as effectively nullifying the
abatement holding of In re Slavonic.278 Thus, for now it would appear that
a trial court has unreviewable discretion to abate or not to abate the lawsuit
pending the outcome of an appraisal. However, one recent opinion from
the San Antonio Court of Appeals has bucked this trend. In In re Acceptance
Indem. Ins.,279 the court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing
the trial court to compel the dispute to appraisal and to abate the case
pending appraisal. 280 The court’s majority opinion contains no discussion
of the question raised by In re Universal Underwriters or In re Allstate as to
whether the court has mandamus jurisdiction to address the abatement
issue. The court seems to have simply overlooked that this is a separate
issue from whether it could issue a writ of mandamus compelling the case
to appraisal.
B. Mandamus Review
As the foregoing discussion and case citations clearly indicate, the denial
of a request for appraisal is subject to interlocutory review through

276. See In re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding).
277. Compare In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 411 (“Delay alone is not enough; a party
must also show prejudice.”), with In re Slavonic, 308 S.W.3d at 562 (“We acknowledge that silence or
inaction for an unreasonable period of time may show an intention to yield a known right.” (citing
Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996))).
278. See In re Cypress Tex. Lloyds, No. 14-11-00713-CV, 2011 WL 4366984, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[T]he parts of our two prior
opinions in which this court granted mandamus relief as to the trial court’s failure to abate during the
appraisal process are no longer good law.”); see also In re Cypress Tex. Lloyds, 425 S.W.3d 444, 448
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding) (“We agree with the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals’ more recent opinion recognizing that, pursuant to controlling authority from our supreme
court, the trial court’s denial of CTL’s motion to abate pending the appraisal is not subject to
mandamus.” (citing In re Cypress Tex. Lloyds, 2011 WL 4366984, at *1)).
279. In re Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., No. 04-18-00231-CV, 2018 WL 4608261 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Sept. 26, 2018, orig. proceeding).
280. Id. at *6.
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mandamus because there is “no adequate remedy by appeal.”281 However,
it is not clear whether a party seeking to avoid a wrongfully compelled
appraisal would be able to avail itself of mandamus relief. Given that similar
language used to describe the public policy encouraging the use of appraisal
has been used for arbitration, the Supreme Court of Texas may follow a
similar double standard for mandamus review of appraisal as it did for
arbitration—though the latter turned on arbitration being a matter of
“statutory imperative.”282
VII. CONCLUSION
There continues to be substantial confusion among Texas courts as to
how the appraisal process posited by many property insurance policies is
supposed to work, and what the timing and extent of court intervention into
the process should be.283 Taking into account the purposes of the appraisal
clause, the intent behind the most recent Texas Supreme Court
pronouncements on the subject, and the purpose of various consumer
protection provisions of the Texas Insurance Code, courts should construe
the process so as not to distort the claims process or vitiate the protections
afforded to insureds by statute and over a century of common law.

281. In re Allstate Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); see also
In re Universal Underwriters, 345 S.W.3d at 412 (“We have held that mandamus relief is appropriate to
enforce an appraisal clause because denying the appraisal would vitiate the insurer’s right to defend its
breach of contract claim.” (citing In re Allstate Cty., 85 S.W.3d at 196)).
282. See, e.g., In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Tex. 2009) (contending that when
there are competing statutory imperatives “the balance will generally tilt toward reviewing orders
compelling arbitration only on final appeal”).
283. Cf. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 521 (Tex. 2018) (“[T]he
confusing nature of our precedent precludes us from faulting USAA for the position it has maintained
throughout this litigation.”).
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